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Abstract: Whilst some literature is of the view that; it is nearly impossible to cultivate good corporate 
governance culture in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), others believe that new strategies of implementing 
corporate governance systems together with political will can deliver SOEs out of their efficiency doldrums. 
This paper presents a scientific analysis of the contentious view on the possibility of creating efficient 
governance mechanisms in SOEs, explores the effective cost for governance failures in SOEs in Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Ethiopia. The paper makes conclusions and recommendation that the 
determinant factor to the success of SOEs in African countries is underpinned on the response of central 
government to the challenges of SOEs. Structural reforms, good governance, clear objectives and efficiency 
require governments to take a decisive position. As a lasting remedial action, knowing which entities and 
when to offload them through privatisation is an option in addressing the governance challenges in African 
SOEs. For strategic SOEs, the paper recommends that governments should consider listing them on public 
stock exchanges. 
 




After 1980, most African countries had attained independence from former colonisers and their new 
administration where under pressure to address inequalities, avert poverty and changing the fortunes of 
their population at the same time growing their economies. During the wave of privatisation, most 
governments retained companies in critical sectors in energy, rail transport, broadcasting services and 
telecommunication (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). The economic strategy to retain some companies as State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) was to provide services to the vulnerable members of the society. However the 
majority of SOEs have not been successful in playing their economic role due to low performance compared 
to private enterprises (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2018). Further to 
their failing role, SOEs in Africa are accused of many ills such as monopolising certain sectors, sabotaging of 
structural reform programmes, gross inefficiencies, poor corporate governance, battleground of political 
games and being conduits for corruption. According to the World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostic (2019) 
poor governance and resistance to structurally reform has eroded pockets of viability leaving the majority of 
them in loss-making position. As strategic economic institutions, governments are forced to offer financial 
support, which has weighed the fiscal down at the same time driving government debt up (Balbuena, 2014). 
 
This paper makes three key contributions to the literature on governance of in African economies debate 
whether SOEs are a catalyst for public value creation or a mere consumer of wasteful financing with 
inefficient operations. First, the paper explores and presents a scientific analysis of the research contentions 
on possibility of creating efficient governance mechanisms in SOEs. Some analysts argue that SOEs may not 
manage to create efficiency now when they have failed to do so in more than three decades (Gumede, 2019). 
On the other hand, other literature argue that new strategies of implementing corporate governance systems 
together with political will can deliver SOEs out of their past failures (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). Second, it 
evaluates the effective cost for governance failures in SOEs to establish a position on when the central 
government should offload certain unviable entities. Lastly, amongst the most debated remedial actions, 
privatisation and public listing, the paper makes conclusive evaluations and recommends strategies to 
address the governance challenges in African SOEs. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the role of SOEs in developing economies. Section 3 then analyses the key corporate 
governance issues facing SOEs in Africa, followed by Section 4 which analyse case studies of both succeeding 
and failing SOEs. Then after, Section 5 present the scientific arguments on the state of SOE governance in 
Africa and the study then concludes with recommendations on the future of SOEs governance on the 
continent in Section 6. 
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The Role of SOEs in Developing Economies: SOEs are independent public entities established and partly or 
wholly owned by government to perform specific economic functions and operate in accordance with certain 
specific legislative Act. In line with international trends, African countries pursue the commercialisation 
strategy by transformation some of state the assets in key sectors into independent entities in some sectors to 
promote more effective and efficient service delivery (International Finance Corporation, 2018). The aim is to 
take advantage of private-sector efficiencies while maintaining service affordability for the vulnerable 
societies at the same time ensuring public accountability. The Integrated Urban Development Framework 
(IUDF) policy report (2013), a policy initiative of the Government of South Africa, coordinated by the 
Department Of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) highlights the importance of SOEs as 
a stakeholder and contributor towards supporting and promoting urban growth and development. 
 
The following are some of the key economic and socio-political roles played by SOEs in Africa’s developing 
economies. First, in viable public enterprises, where income is higher than cost, surpluses would directly 
accrue to government and become readily accessible for financing both physical and human capital projects. 
This means government would have savings at its disposal, supporting its national budget through budget 
funding and reducing reliance on taxes. For instance, the government of Kenya turned to its SOEs for help 
ease the burden by releasing their surpluses and other unutilised funds as special dividend (Wasuna, 2019). 
The Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC) handed over US$49 million (Sh5 billion Kenyan shilling) to the National 
Treasury to cover government financial deficits from less than expected tax collections and huge interest 
obligations fall due. Second, in certain sectors that is capital intensive, risky or crucial sectors strategic to the 
economy due to the linkages they create. By nationalizing and controlling entities in key strategic sectors, the 
government guarantees socially responsible performance. Third, SOEs support the government mandate of 
providing public goods for the benefit or well-being of the public. 
 
By running commercial enterprises, the profits generated by government are enjoyed by all members of the 
society through the provision and maintenance of public goods and infrastructure, instead of a few private 
shareholders. Fourth, many African countries that were under colonisation are still struggling to addressing 
the twin problems of poverty and inequality (Lephakga, 2017). It is the goal of SOEs to assume 
responsibilities that promote societal equality through redistribution of incomes. Well-functioning SOEs are 
critical in the decolonisation of the presence of colonial industrial interests, a major impediment for socio-
economic development. Fifth, the creating employment is usually one of the priorities of any government 
policy success (Gillis, 2011). SOEs are key institutions for government to create employment as retrenchment 
is the soft target for restructuring and reforms in private firms (Afegbua & Ejalonibu, 2015). Governments are 
also sometimes forced to take over failing private companies in order to avoid the unemployment 
consequences upon bankruptcy. Lastly, SOEs help in reducing concentration of private economic power and 
breaking monopolies of private sector, which can be abused against both the government and the welfare of 
the society. 
 
2. Literature Analysis 
 
Scientific Argument on SOEs Governance: The philosophy of the argument in this study has four 
dimensions. First, the number of failing SOEs in Africa far outweighs the ones that are successful. Second, the 
business model of the majority of SOEs is not viable, they operate at a loss with expenditure outweighing 
revenues, and hence they are constantly seeking government bailouts. Third, SOEs have failed to transform 
with the changing operating environment for years, the questions is how they will transform now as the same 
reasons that failed them over the years are still in existence. Lastly, the role of SOEs and their original 
objectives have evolved, studies have been critical on whether their mandates are still relevant. Corporate 
governance, defined by the King III report (2009) as “the process of supervision and control intended to 
ensure that the company’s management acts in accordance with the interests of shareholders”, has been at 
the centre of debates on the operations of SOEs across Africa. There has been corporate governance failures 
and non-compliance with legislation in the majority of SOEs cases (Malunga, 2007). A good corporate 
governance system would ensure accountability, transparency and effective controls (Frederick, 2011). The 
following are some of the key corporate governance challenges facing SOEs in Africa. 
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Lack of Internal Controls: Lack of internal control policy to safeguard assets, promote accountability, 
increase efficiency and stop fraudulent behaviour has been one of the major corporate governance challenges 
in SOEs (OECD, 2018). In cases where internal controls are in place, they are not properly implemented. The 
African Peer Review Mechanism (2007; 2008) Country Review Report (CRR) of Algeria and Benin find that 97 
percent of SOEs in Algeria have no internal auditing and control systems committees. Over 50 percent SOEs in 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Uganda went for three years without publishing audited financial 
statements (Balbuena, 2014), against the international standards reporting best practices which recommends 
that audited financial statements should be published within six months after the completion of a financial 
year (Price Water Cooper, 2015). As a result, the available financial reports are outdated and the true 
financial status is unknown to executives and accounting officers. The office of the Auditors General or its 
equivalent in other countries usually fails to audit public enterprises mainly due to a combination of; lack of 
capacity, incomplete accounts and substandard financial statements. 
 
Lack of Transparency and Oversight: Failure to produce financial statements, lack of proper accounting 
standards and weak auditing practices (OECD, 2018) has led to low levels of financial disclosure. There is 
therefore no transparency to both accounting officers and the public on how accountability and performance 
of most public enterprises. It is thus difficult to provide oversight, ensure accountability and responsibility on 
institutions whose major part of performance monitoring system is non-functional. This situation has been 
the underlying cause for concealment of SOEs spending, debt accumulation, creating conditions for 
corruption and failure of public enterprises that is weighing down the whole fiscal balances. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Country Report (2018) on Mozambique, one of the key drivers of 
government debt is financial support to the country’s biggest public enterprises which is spent through 
irregular expenditures. Mozambique’s SOEs accumulated unsustainable and hid debt that they will not be 
able to repay; hence they either require debt forgiveness or restructuring. Limited control on SOEs 
(Proindicus, Ematum and MAM) borrowing resulted in large undisclosed external debt of US$1.4 billion, 
which was 11 percent of Mozambique’s 2015 GDP, an extreme risk exposure in unviable SOEs. 
 
The three companies established to operate in fishing tuna, providing maritime protection and building 
shipyards (respectively) were created shortly before the borrowing took place and were all headed by the 
same CEO, who at that time was a senior officer of the security services. Mozambique defaulted in 2016 on 
the $59.8 million coupon for its $727 million Tuna Eurobond, borrowed by its fishing SOE, Ematum and 
guaranteed by the government. This amount was borrowed on top of another $500 million from Credit Suisse 
and $350 million from Russian bank VTB to finance a new tuna fishing infrastructure. The APRM CRR for 
Uganda (2009) find that some SOEs have not properly qualified board of directors. In other cases where the 
directors are qualified, they will be weak and compromised to provide economic oversight. The CRR also 
reports that some directs are usually not willing to take risk by making critical management decisions due to 
fear of being victimised by their political principals or disappointing the government, even when they are 
subject to performance contracts. APRM CRR for Kenya (2006) find that the appointments of directors in 
SOEs are based on political considerations. The report highlighted that, within the SOEs themselves there is 
an endemic problem of ‘secrecy and mistrust’ as employees do have suspicions against each other’s’ political 
affiliation and allegiance, in the APRM CRR for Mauritius. 
 
Undue Political Interference: The appointment of SOEs board of directors is the responsibility of the 
Minister in charge with public enterprises ministry. There is often a dilemma of maintaining a balance on the 
appointment of a board that promote political agendas or one that makes unpopular decisions to maintain 
viability of SOEs (Corrigan, 2014). Evidence from APRM CCRs suggests that the former is more common, 
hence boards are compromised and entangles in the liability of the appointing principals. They are therefore 
unable to operate without undue political interference once appointed. The CRR (2013) for Tanzania notes 
the problem of ubiquitous links between the ruling party, the bureaucracy and business entities. Senior 
government officials and Members of Parliament are on several cases part of the SOEs boards, which 
undermine board accountability to the wider society. 
 
South Africa has been similarly criticised, most notably in relation to a number of its key SOEs; South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Eskom, South African Airways (SAA), Denel and Transnet, where political 
appointments produced a deep patronage system in violation of corporate governance principles (Sunita, 
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2019). Deep rooted structural problems are also compounded by lack of clarity on the mandate, objectives 
and oversight of SOEs. In some instances, SOEs have been used by political figures to pronounce their 
establishments in fighting their factional battles, with some deliberately sabotaging their areas of core 
competences for them to fail on delivering their mandate (Friedman, 2017). Loyal ruling party ‘cadres’ that 
cannot be deployed to government are usually deployed into SOEs either as a way to get rid of them from 
mainstream politics or for them to hang around awaiting government appointments. For instance, in 
Zimbabwe, Retired Army Service Chiefs and former war liberators with strong links. 
 
Nepotism and Corruption: Several reports (Balbuena, 2014; Frederick, 2011; OECD, 2018a; OECD, 2018b) 
have revealed that SOEs have been used as conduits for perpetuating acts of corruption and nepotism. The 
OECD report (`2018a) reveals that nepotism and cronyism has become apparent in African SOEs as 
appointments are not subject to any standard selection process, assessments and interviews. A report by the 
Public Protector of South Africa (2015) reveals that the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) – one 
of the largest SOEs – was riddled with nepotism and conflict of interest where senior management employed 
their relatives and give their spouses business. In the majority of the country’s SOEs departments, salutations 
in the corridors were “good morning uncle, good afternoon sister”. This challenge costed SOEs billions of 
dollars through incompetence and inefficiency. In the South Africa’s Commission of Inquiry into State Capture 
(2019), it was revealed that, one of the SOEs senior managers had 12 blood relatives working in the same 
department, promoted twice and got an average salary increase of 350 percent in one year without 
reasonable justification or merits. 
 
In Nigeria, a case study by Amakiri (2015), absenteeism in SOEs was over 80 percent and no disciplinary 
actions was being taken against them. PRASA’s chief engineering executive, who was at the centre of the 
acquisition of unsuitable locomotives, had fake doctoral qualification and was employed without verification 
of qualifications, a corporate governance failure which costed the SOEs more than US$338 million (R5 
billion). Generally, the salaries and packs in many SOEs are beyond the standard cost to company expected 
for such posts levels (OECD, 2018). Executives over the retirement age limit are still working, others have 
been retired and rehired as specialised consultants, some of them over 60 years still claiming for their 
children school fees allowances (Gomba, 2019). The anti-corruption units in most countries face challenges in 
prosecuting these cases due to lack of evidence (Times of Swaziland, 2019). In South Africa, during the 
investigations into the “State Capture” cases revealed several incidences of threats and intimidation against 
witnesses of corruption and nepotism cases, which indicate deep-rotted patronage networks (Mutize & 
Gossel, 2017). 
 
Inefficient Monopolies: Many SOEs in Africa enjoy monopoly or monopsony powers by virtue of 
government ownership, lack of competition and policy which is favourable for them, which often provide 
cover for inefficiencies and abuse of resources. These entities are largely known for their bureaucratic 
constraints, lack of investment incentives, pricing controls, centralized decision making, and restriction on 
hiring and firing workers. Due to control of the businesses by government bureaucracies or by legislation, 
decisions are slow and unresponsive to the immediate needs of the company. The fact that any surpluses 
revert back to the government; it is a disincentive for management and labour to work more profitably. Due 
to their monopolistic position, SOEs create make distortions as there is no free and open competition in the 
sectors they operate. 
 
Weak Capitalisation: Over 90 percent of SOEs that are fully controlled by government are currently facing 
this challenge of inadequate capitalisation (Balbuena, 2014). The main drivers of low capitalisation and 
balance sheet shrinkage is the unsustainable business models of SOEs, in which they are not able to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover the business running costs. As such, without balance sheet support, SOEs 
capitalisation position fast shrink and their liquidity positions deteriorate. Most of the services they provide 
such as electricity, transport, communication and broadcasting benefit the poor bracket of the society. To the 
ruling party are either CEOs, board of directors and senior managers in key public enterprises such as the 
Grain Marketing Board (GMB), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), Zimbabwe United Passenger Company 
(ZUPCO) and Air Zimbabwe. These individuals often have no skills or experience in managing such 
enterprises, leading to disastrous performance. These success case studies are a result of a clear, considered 
Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies (ISSN: 2220-6140) 
Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 9-16, April 2020  
13 
 
and profit-orientated strategic business model underpinned on professionalism, industry experience and 
commercial astuteness. 
 
The government is therefore normally reluctant to approve service costs increase in order to protect its poor 
population that may not afford and will be most affected by the rising cost. As a result, for SOEs to survive, 
they are in constant need of government bailout and subsidies, which has severely strained fiscal budgets and 
investments in crucial developmental projects (IMF, 2018). Weak capitalisations have left government with 
no option but to either bailout or issue guarantees for SOEs to borrow through financial markets. In Senegal, 
government-guaranteed liabilities and debt of SOEs constitute 11.4 percent of the country’s GDP (IMF, 2019). 
The South African government have exposure to the tune of 4 percent of GDP in Eskom Power Company, in 
which it guaranteed a total of R462 billion rands. These amounts are quickly exhausted as the SOEs are not 
profitable and government takes times to respond to the balance sheet challenges. 
 
Multiple and Conflicting Objectives: In most of the cases government owns 100 percent or significant 
portion of share and has sufficient power to determine objectives and other decisions. Governments spells 
the mandates of SOEs as providing goods and services affordable to the poor members of the society, which is 
certainly less than cost-covering prices, at the same time they are expected to operate viably, In many cases, 
SOEs have gone for years seeking approval without success from government and its regulatory arms for 
price increases that will help them to remain profitable. The much talked about ‘reforms and restructuring’ 
programmes are never implemented as they are met with strong resistance from employee unions and 
politicians who seek to avert possible retrenchments (Ritchken, 2014). The government and its SOEs are 
perceived to be generators of employment, restructuring decisions are often overridden by political 




To examine the governance failures and success of SOEs in Africa, the study considers selected cases of SOEs; 
the Ethiopian Airlines, South Africa’s Telkom Company, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s Gecamines, Air 
Zimbabwe, South Africa’s Eskom Power Company and Ghana’s Tema Oil Refinery. These large SOEs present a 
spectrum of government entities in which significant resources have been committed but with outcomes on 
the different sides of the continuum. These SOEs represent government entities that have done well and 
others that have not been successful to adequately analyse the argument in literature that the number of 
SOEs that have performed well financially and economically are outnumbered by those that failed to meet the 
expectations of their governments. The analysis further considers aggregate data from the World Bank 
Report (2018) Energy Sector Management Assistance Program on SOE performance which presents 12 West 
African countries, 62 percent of which are operating at a loss and 36 percent are in a state of technical 
insolvency with a negative net worth. The OECD report of 2018 was also qualitatively analysed, which 




The Successful SOE Cases: According the CAPA Centre for Aviation Outlook for Africa (2019), the Ethiopian 
Airways is currently the fastest growing, most profitable and largest African airline, which has grown at an 
annual average of 25 percent since 2005. Its annual profit has been exceeding US$175 million since 2014, 
higher profit than the total of all the African airlines. The Ethiopian Airlines now has the highest international 
connectivity than any other airline in Africa. Its fleet is also the largest, youngest and most sophisticated 
passenger airplanes in Africa, with an average age of less than five years (Barlow, 2016). Another successful 
SOE, Telkom SA Ltd, a South African wire line and wireless telecommunications company, operating in more 
than 38 countries across the African continent is a semi-privatised SOE in which the government owns 39 
percent shareholding. Telkom has consistently posted a profit after tax of more than R2.5 billion rands since 
2016 from its 4 billion subscribers. 
 
The company is currently the market leader in the broadband space and according to the World Factbook 
(2019), it is the best developed and most modern telecommunications company in Africa. In 2019, the 
government received a significant dividend of 249c per ordinary share despite the difficult operating 
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environment in the country. The governments and board of directors have allowed the management space to 
exercise their capacity professionalism and operate the business on commercial considerations, only 
maintaining clear lines of accountability. With the support of the board, Telkom cut 2000 jobs during the year 
ending March 2019 to reduce operational costs and remain viable. Being managed like this, without full 
privatization, these enterprises are able to generate sufficient income to mid their expenditure needs, repay 
their own debts and on top of that pay dividends to the government. 
 
The Failing SOE Cases: Gecamines was the biggest mining company in DRC’s, but failed in 2014 due to 
mismanagement and poor investment decisions. The company reportedly failed to account for US$750 
million from DRC's copper mine privatisation program in 2017. Air Zimbabwe is amongst 92 other SOEs 
whose latest audit reports by the country's treasury show that they are technically insolvent. For the past 10 
years, the airline has been operating at a loss and currently has only a single aircraft covering its routes. 
Moody’s rating agency has downgraded the state power firm, Eskom’s credit rating deeper into sub-
investment territory (from B2 to B3, six notches below the investment grade level, with a negative outlook) 
citing that the government’s plan to reorganise the cash-strapped South African firm would be hard to 
implement as it has no explicit support from the cabinet. Many years of mismanagement and corruption has 
resulted in a ballooning debt burden which currently stands at around R440 billion, 62 percent of which is 
guaranteed by government. The company has also been allocated R59 billion in operational support as it 
cannot operate optimally. Tema Oil Refinery, Ghana’s state-owned oil refinery recently sought US$70 million 
credit guarantees from the government after lenders declined to issue it loans for crude purchases. The 
company had halted production on June 21 after running out of crude stock. Its weaknesses are well 
documented, ranging from distress financial position, and utilization capacity, weak governance structure, 
poor maintenance culture, to production and storage losses. 
 
5. Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
The Future of SOES Governance: There is no doubt that Africa needs SOEs to successful support its 
development goals and to realise its Agenda 2063, ‘the Africa we want’. There is however an urgent need to 
rethink the ways of maintaining SOEs relevant to the current developmental needs. It is the governance of 
SOEs that has been letting most governments down. It is not by coincidence that there are very few examples 
of successful SOEs compared to the failing ones. The future of SOEs is underpinned in developing good 
governance throughout the ownership, management and employee structures as the tone for good work 
ethics begins with the shareholders, boards and senior executives before cascading down the structure of 
command. This paper makes the following recommendations. 
 
Rationalisation: Rationalisation of state-owned enterprises has become inevitable as most SOEs dates back 
to the post-independence era and many are no longer relevant to SA's economic trajectory since market 
conditions have changed from the original “post-independence era reasons” for their existence, in many 
instances rendering their business models unsustainable. There is need urgent rationalisation, periodically 
and substantively identifying those that are strategic to the country’s development. The motive for the 
mandate of the strategic SOE must be proven on a clear and acceptable basis, such as security of supply, 
correcting a development failure, state security or natural monopoly. An SOE remaining strategic is a function 
of factors that may be affected by changes in the operating environment, such as markets, technological 
advancements and political evolution. The evaluation of the strategic SOEs should be repeated periodically to 
ensure they remain so and nonstrategic SOEs should account for their continued existence through a rigorous 
parliamentary process. 
 
Based on their relevance to the country’s strategic plans. There should be a framework for rationalisation 
would need to be adopted and serve as a basis for the evaluation and final decision on each SOE. SOEs exist to 
address development failures and close gaps where markets or the private sector cannot. Doing away with 
some SOEs could create more efficiency and more jobs as well as a better environment for businesses. 
Opening spaces to the private sector reduced operation costs and improve the quality of services rendered 
due to increased competition. The government will need to make a budget available for the rationalisation of 
the SOEs. Technical teams responsible for rationalisation will have to account to the Treasury, and the 
proposed SOE committee or council should be chaired by the president of the republic. A planned, negotiated 
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rationalisation process will help avoid a less considered fire-sale of state assets. Such a formal transparent 
process will also inspire confidence in all stakeholders. 
 
Listing on Public Exchanges: SOEs may be listed on financial market exchanges without necessarily 
privatizing them. By selling their shares on public exchanges, public entities will have access to capital and 
also have the opportunity to measure their competences through daily share performance. On the other hand, 
governments will retain majority shareholding whilst SOE management is held accountable through strict 
compliance requirements. Private sector investments through exchanges will also improve business 
confidence and become part of the enforcement structure to keep SOEs competent. 
 
Unbundling Monoliths and Disposing Non-Essential SOEs: Some institutions become less important with 
time. It becomes costly to keep them. Governments should know when to dispose some non essential SOEs 
through liquidation or privatisation. When government continue to bailout non-essential and incompetent 
SOEs with a goal to either preserve employment or maintain national brand image, the indirect cost is 
massively huge. Economic reforms should come up with structural changes that weed out government 
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